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NORTHERN KENTUCKY LAW REVIEW
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN KENTUCKY:
ETHICS AND UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE CONSIDERATIONS
by Richard H. Underwood'
I. INTRODUCTION
This article is an extended version of a presentation I made at a training
course for hearing officers sponsored by the Office of the Attorney General,
Division of Administrative Hearings.2 In my original presentation, I was asked
to focus on the ethics of the administrative adjudicator. I was asked to answer
some specific questions, which I will include here for the reader's benefit. In this
more complete treatment, I would also like to discuss the ethics of lawyers and
other representatives appearing before administrative agencies.3
The Kentucky Courts had begun to "judicialize" the administrative
hearing process in the early 1970's, 4 but it was not until 1996 that Kentucky put
into effect a general administrative hearing procedures acte outlining
"standardized minimum procedural protections."6 This important development
1 J.D., The Ohio State University; Spears-Gilbert Professor of Law, University of Kentucky
College of Law; Former Chairman, Kentucky Bar Association Ethics Committee (1984-1998);
Former Chairman, Kentucky Bar Association Unauthorized Practice Committee (1984-1996);
Former Chairman, Kentucky Bar Association Model Rules Committee. The author would like to
thank Professor John Rogers for commenting on an early draft of this article, and to thank Dean
Vestal for providing the author with a Summer research grant.
2 Richard H. Underwood, Address at Administrative Hearings Before State Boards And Agencies
Frankfort, Ky. (June 29, 2001).
3 For a similar treatment, see L. Harold Levinson, Professional Responsibility Issues in
Administrative Adjudication, 2 BYU L. PuB. L. 219 (1988) (hereinafter Levinson]. See also Harold
Marquis, An Appraisal Of Attorney's Responsibilities Before Administrative Agencies, 26 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 285 (1976).
4 See, e.g., Kaelin v. City of Louisville, 643 S.W.2d 590 (Ky. 1971) (parties in an administrative
proceeding must have an opportunity to examine and present evidence, and cross-examine
witnesses); Kentucky State Racing Commission v. Fuller, 481 S.W.2d 298 (Ky. 1972) (an
administrative decision must be based on "substantial evidence"); Big Sandy Community Action
Program v. Chaffins, 502 S.W.2d 526 (Ky. 1973) (an agency decision must be based on legally
competent evidence). The notion that hearing officers and agency lawyers perform judicial or
adjudicatory functions that entitle them to absolute immunity was recognized in Butz v. Economou,
438 U.S. 478 (1978). See also Watts v. Burkhart, 978 F.2d 269, 273 (6th Cir. 1992) ("state
officials subject to restraints comparable to those imposed by the Administrative Procedure Act and
performing adjudicatory functions in resolving potentially heated controversies are entitled to
absolute immunity from damages liability for their judicial acts").
See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13B.005-.170 (Michie 1996 and Supp. 2000).
6 See generally Susan S. Durant, Procedural Due Process Past Due: Kentucky's Uniform
Administrative Hearing Procedures Act Goes Into Effect, KENTUCKY BENCH & BAR, Winter 1997,
at 6, 8 [hereinafter Durant]. For an excellent handbook on the Kentucky APA see MATTHEW
MOONEY, KENTUCKY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT: KRS 13B ANNOTATED (UK/CLE 2000).
See also KENTUCKY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (UK/CLE 1999) [hereinafter KENTUCKY
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW].
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has encouraged participants in the administrative process to take more seriously
considerations of professionalism.7
II. THE ETHIcs OF THE ADJUDICATOR
A. Institutional Bias
Claims of conflict of interest or unethical conduct on the part of the
adjudicator or hearing officer are usually couched in terms of bias.' Before
addressing the subjects of personal bias and disqualification of the individual
hearing officer, some mention should be made of institutional or structural bias.9
Administrative officials work for the executive branch of government,
and their administrative work may involve legislation, rule-making, prosecution,
or quasi-judicial adjudication.'0 Needless to say, the degree of "fairness"
required may vary according to the type of decision being made by or within the
agency." When the proceeding is quasi-judicial, there will be a natural tendency
to draw an analogy between the administrative decision-maker and a judge.
12
However, the analogy is not exact.13  We cloister our judges. Judges are
supposed to be apolitical and detached. Can the same be said of administrative
adjudicators?
14
Some administrative adjudicators are elected officials whose positions
also involve lawmaking, rule-making and executive functions. Investigatory,
prosecutorial and quasi-judicial functions are often combined in the same
agency.' 5 In the majority of states, the traditional model for adjudication has
been the agency staff system in which the adjudicator is an employee of the
agency. The adjudicator's rulings are recommendations subject to review and
modification by the agency.' 6 Proceedings may be more inquisitorial than might
7 Presentations made during the Attorney General's training course for hearing officers included
discussions of professionalism, discipline and order in the hearing, and ethics, as well as updates in
the law of evidence. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
8 See generally ALFRED AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 8.5,6 (1993)
(discussing personal bias and prejudgment) [hereinafter AMAN].
The terms "institutional bias" and "structural bias" are used by Alfred Aman, Jr. & William
Mayton. See AMAN, supra note 8, § 8.5.5. See also RICHARD FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION:
RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES, § 30.8.1 (1996) [hereinafter FLAMM].
I See generally AMAN, supra note 8, § 15.1 (Administrative Agencies and the Executive Branch -
Introduction).
1 Compare AMAN, supra note 8, § 8.1 (Overview of Formal Agency Adjudication) with AMAN,
supra note 8, § 9.1 (Overview of Informal Agency Adjudication). See also AMAN, supra note 8, §
7.6.4 (Post-Goldberg: The Emergence of Alternatives to Trial-Type Procedures) (considering due
Frocess requirements of various agency actions).
See, e.g., AMAN., supra note 8, § 8.5.2 (The Administrative Law Judge). See also AMAN, supra
note 8, § 8.5.5 (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421' U.S. 35 (1975), wherein Justice White compared
administrative processes [presided over by agency decision-makers] to criminal processes [presided
over by judges]).
13 See, e.g., AMAN, supra note 8, § 8.1.
14 See generally AMAN, supra note 8, §§ 8.1 and 8.5.5.
15 See AMAN, supra note 8, § 8.5.4.
16 See AMAN, supra note 8, § 8.1.
2002]
NORTHERN KENTUCKY LAW REVIEW.,
be the. case in judicial proceedings. Agencies have statutory mandates and goals,
and the adjudicator or hearing officer will presumably be expected to, develop the
record in such a way as will carry out the statutory mandate. 7 Finally, "both of
the traditional justifications for administrative adjudications - administrative
expertise and the avoidance of the cumbersome machinery of a court trial -
necessarily imply that administrative adjudicators will possess a certain degree of
prior knowledge and consequent prejudgment of matters of law and policy."'
8
"[T]he case law generally rejects the proposition that a combination of
functions in one agency necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias, or
that such a combination automatically constitutes a denial of due process such as
to warrant disqualification of the involved administrative adjudicator."' 9 On the
other hand, when functions are combined in a single individual, the case for
disqualification for "unfairness" or bias is stronger.2° How can an administrative
adjudicator deal fairly with a party or parties if he or she has performed other
functions - investigatory or prosecutorial - in the same matter?21 As we shall see,
the federal APA and Kentucky APA recognize and deal with this problem by
requiring a separation of functions within the agency.22
To deal with the perception of institutional or structural bias (when
functions are combined within the same agency), some states have moved away
from an agency staff model to a central panel model, in which an independent
managing agency is created to handle administrative hearings.23 Separating the
adjudicator (administrative law judge or hearing officer) from the agency makes
the process appear fairer and more objective.24 However, there are costs, which
17 Karen Lewis, Administrative Law Judges and The Code of Judicial Conduct: A Need for
Regulated Ethics, 94 DICK L. REv. 929, 947 (1990).
I FLAMM, supra note 9, § 30.5.5, at 945-46 (citing Wagner v. Jackson Cty. Bd. of Zoning Adj., 857
S.W.2d 285 289 (Mo. App. 1993) and Bougham v. Bd. of Engineering Examiners, 611 P.2d 670
(Or. Ct. App. 1980)).
•19 FLAMM, supra note 9, § 30.8.1, at 958 (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 65 (1975) and
Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. No. I v. Hortonville Education Assn., 426 U.S. 42 (1976)). See also
Nicholson v. Judicial Retirement and Removal Comm.'n, 562 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Ky. 1978);
Cabinet for Human Resources, Dept. of Health Servs. v. Kanter, 898 S.W.2d 508, 512 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1995); Jones v. Cabinet for Human Resources, Div. for Licensure and Regulations, 710
S.W.2d 862, 865 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986). The Model Code of Ethics of the National Association of
Hearing Officers, Section III, states that "the hearing official should not withdraw from a
proceeding if the hearing officials' impartiality is challenged solely on the basis that the hearing
officials are employed by an agency appearing in the proceeding." MODEL CODE OF ETHICS § Il (3)
(Nat'l Ass'n of Hearing Officers), available at <http://www.naho.org/code of ethics.htm>.
2 0 See, e.g., Grolier, Inc. v. F.T.C., 615 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1980), appealed after remand, 699 F.2d
983 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983) (precluding ALJs from hearing a case if they
had actually performed investigative and prosecutorial functions in the same or factually related
cases).
21 See id.
22 See generally FLAMM, supra note 9, § 30.8.3.
23 See, e.g., Judge William Sherill, The Florida Division of Administrative Hearings, 75 FLA. B. J.
22 (2001); David Heyndericks, Finding Middle Ground: Oregon Experiments with a Central
Hearing Panel for Contested Case Proceedings, 36 WILLIAMETrE L. REV. 219 (2000); Jay ByBee,
Agency Expertise, ALI Independence, and Administrative Courts: The. Recent Changes in
Louisiana's Administrative Procedure Act, 59 LA. L. REv. 431 (1999); Christopher McNeil, Due
Process and the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act: The Central Panel Proposal, 23 OmIo N.U. L.
REv. 783 (1997); Allen Hoberg, Administrative Hearings: State Central Panels in the 1990s, 46
ADMrN. L. REV. 75 (1994).
24 See AMAN, supra note 8, § 8.5.2.
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may include a loss of the "expertise" previously alluded to.25 Again, this is all
part of the movement to further "judicialize" the administrative process.
26
In Kentucky, KRS Chapter 13B created a Division of Administrative
Hearings 27 to provide a limited number of separately housed and independent
hearing officers who can be used by agencies. 2 This looks very much like a
small central panel. 29 It will be interesting to see if this panel grows and replaces
other agency employed hearing officers in the future. Some agencies, like the
Natural Resources and Environmental Cabinet, the Cabinet for Human
Resources, and the Department of Worker's Claims, have their own "cluster" of
hearing officers. 30 KRS 13B.030(2) also authorizes agencies to employ private
attorneys to serve as hearing officers.3
B. Individual Bias
It is probably fair to say that in the absence of statutory guidance some
courts have been reluctant to disqualify administrative adjudicators or to set aside
their decisions on grounds of bias (1) merely because the administrative
adjudicator participated in a matter in a non-adjudicative capacity, (2) merely
because the administrative adjudicator held views on particular issues of law or
public policy, or (3) merely because he or she developed or expressed opinions
based on experience.3 2  It will be noted later that there has also been some
reluctance to apply the strict standards contained in the ABA Code of Judicial
Conduct to all administrative adjudicators.33 The standards applied by judges in
disqualifying administrative adjudicators have not been uniform, and have varied
25 For example: "[A]gency adjudications are expected to be steeped in the complexities of their
regulatory fields. They are expected to have acquired substantial experience with both the law in
their area and the ranges of factual situations to which it applies." AMAN, supra note 8, § 8.1.
26 See Gerald Ruth, Unification of the Administrative Adjudicatory Process: An Emerging
Framework to Increase "Judicialization" In Pennsylvania, 5 WIDENER J. PUB. L 297 (1996).
27 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13B.010 (8) (Michie 1996); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15.111 (Michie
1996 & Supp. 2000).28 See Durant, supra note 6, at 9.
29 "States with centralized administrative law judge or hearing officer divisions are in the minority;
various states simply have hearing officers associated with each agency. Kentucky has followed a
middle ground in which there are clusters of hearing officers." Durant, supra note 6, at 9 [citations
omitted].3 0 See Durant, supra note 6, at 9.
31 Id. This suggests that there is at least a preference for lawyer hearing officers. See infra Part
IV.A.
32 Part of the reluctance to disqualify may arise from the fact that administrative adjudicators may
be difficult to replace because of limited staffing and the need for specific expertise. In some
contexts the reluctance may be based on the fact that the adjudicator will be a part-timer who
makes his living from other work in the community and who could not or would not serve if every
'connection" to the agency or to outside pursuits could be deemed disqualifying. See FLAMM, supra
note 9, § 30.1, at 928. See also the limits on a hearing officer's practice of law, infra note 92 and
accompanying text.
33 See discussion infra Part I.D.
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from a demand that the moving party prove actual bias, 4 to a requirement of
proof that the risk of actual bias is great, to a showing of "appearance of bias."35
In Kentucky, in administrative proceedings not exempted from the
provisions of Chapter 13B, 6 one of the grounds for disqualification of a hearing
officer is that the hearing officer has "a personal bias toward any party to a
proceeding which would cause a prejudgment on the outcome of the
proceeding. 37  Fortunately, this general statement is supplemented by other
statutory grounds.38
C. Statutory Grounds for Disqualification
It was noted previously that the courts have allowed functions to be
combined in an agency so long as an "internal" separation of functions is
maintained. 39 Along these lines, KRS 13B.040 [Qualifications of hearing officer]
provides in pertinent part:
(1) A person who has served as an investigator or prosecutor in
an administrative hearing or in its preadjudicative stage shall
not serve as hearing officer or assist or advise a hearing officer
in the same proceeding. This shall not be construed as
preventing a person who has participated as a hearing officer in
a determination of probable cause or other equivalent
preliminary determination from serving as a hearing officer in
the same proceeding.4
It should be noted that this Kentucky law, like its federal counterpart,4 '
is stricter than the standard applied in the constitutional "due process" cases.42
34 See, e.g., AMAN, supra note 8, § 8.5.6. In rulemaking proceedings, a standard of "clear and
convincing showing" is required to prove bias. See id. (citing Association of National Advertisers,
Inc. v. F.T.C., 627 F.2d 1151, 1168-69 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980)).
35 See, e.g., AMAN, supra note 8, § 8.5.6. (stating "This standard [Cinderella] takes both actual
fairness as well as the appearance of propriety into account.") (citing Cinderella Career & Finishing
Schools, Inc. v. F.T.C., 425 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
36 For exemptions, see Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13B.020 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2000).
37 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13B.040 (b) (4) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2000).
38 See generally "Qualifications of Hearing Officer," Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13B.040 (Michie 1996
& Supp. 2000).39 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
40 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13B.040 (1) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2000).
41 5 U.S.C. §554(d) provides in pertinent part:
An employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting
functions for an agency in a case may not, in that or a factually related case, participate or
advise in the decision, recommended decision, or agency review ... except as witness or
counsel in public proceedings. This subsection does not apply ... (C) to the agency or a
member or members of the body comprising the agency.
Id.
42 See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 58 (1975) (holding that "the combination of investigative
and adjudicative functions does not, without more, constitute a due process violation . . ."). See
also CHARLES KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.11 (2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter
KOCH].
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* Other grounds of disqualification, and the procedures for disqualification, are
set forth in KRS 13B.040 as follows:
(2)(a) A hearing officer, agency head, or member Of an agency
head who is serving as a hearing officer shall voluntarily
disqualify himself and withdraw from any case in which he
cannot afford a fair and impartial hearing or consideration. Any
party may request the disqualification of a hearing officer,
agency head, or member of the agency head by filing an
affidavit, upon discovery of facts establishing grounds for a
disqualification, stating the particular grounds upon which he
claims that a fair and impartial hearing cannot be accorded. A
request for. the disqualification of a hearing officer shall be
answered by the agency head within sixty (60) days of its filing.
The request for disqualification and the disposition of the
request shall be part of the official record of the proceeding.
Requests for disqualification of a hearing officer shall be
determined by the agency head. Requests for disqualification of
a hearing officer who is a member of the agency head shall be
determined by the majority of the remaining members of the
agency head.
(b) Grounds for disqualification of a hearing officer shall
include, but shall not be limited, to the following:
1. Serving as an investigator or prosecutor in the
proceeding or the pre-adjudicative stages of the
proceeding;
2. Participating in an ex parte communication which
would prejudice the proceedings;
3. Having a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the
proceeding; or
4. Having a personal bias toward any party to a
proceeding which would cause a prejudgment on
the outcome of the proceeding.43
By the terms of the statute, these grounds are not exclusive, but there is
little supplemental Kentucky caselaw. Presumably the practitioner could turn to
secondary authority including the Code of Judicial Conduct," federal caselaw,
and the law of sister states. What is, or is not, personal bias? What relational
interests might provide a basis for disqualification? What is the standard under §
43 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13B.040 (2) (a), (b) (Michie Supp. 2000).
,4See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990). See also infra notes 86-91 and accompanying
text.
.2002]
NORTHERN KENTUCKY LAW REVIEW
2(a):and § (b)4? It does not look like an "appearance of impropriety" standard. 45
Will that do, or does the movant have to provide concrete evidence of bias
emanating from an extrajudicial source? Are there times when disqualification
will be appropriate even though legally sufficient proof of actual bias has not
been presented?46
As noted previously, when functions are combined in an individual (as
opposed to being combined in a single agency) the case for impropriety is
strong.47 Even in jurisdictions that do not apply the Code of Judicial Conduct to
administrative adjudicators, the claim of impropriety will be particularly strong if
the individual adjudicator can be shown to possess prior knowledge of the facts
to be determined, or personally investigated or initiated the investigation, or has a
pecuniary interest in the outcome.48 Still, in the absence of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, generalizations are hazardous. Courts being asked to disqualify an
adjudicator may require a showing of "actual participation" in the case.49 That is,
a court may be reluctant to infer a basis for disqualification from an individual's
title or from an organizational wiring diagram. 0
Along these lines, one question I was asked just before my talk at the
training session was whether an administrative agency may employ an in-house
hearing officer who is also the agency's general counsel or a regular prosecutor?
Under KRS 13B.040(2)(a)' or (b) does he or she have to have actually
participated as an investigator or prosecutor in the particular case? Are we to
assume or presume bias, or does actual bias have to be established? Who bears
the burden of proof on that? There is some language in the famous case Wong
Yang Sung v. McGrath,5' suggesting that it is unrealistic to expect a prosecutor to
be able to investigate and prosecute "like cases" one day, and then put on his
hearing officer cap and fairly judge "like cases" the next day, and so on.5 2 This
argument has some common sense appeal. But subsequent cases do not exactly
take an expansive view of the need for disqualification under the APA. For
example, in Au Yi Lau v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service,
53
it was held that the Chairman of the Board of Immigration Appeals did not
participate improperly in the decision of a deportation matter although he was
formerly employed as an attorney in the office of the INS General Counsel,
although the General Counsel had supervisory responsibility over both the trial
attorney who "prosecuted" the proceeding and the appellate counsel who
presented to the Board the opposition of the INS to the petitioners' motions to
reopen.54 The court reasoned that under §554(d) of the APA "investigative and
41 Compare KY. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2, Sup. CT. R. 4.300, Ky. R. ANN. Vol. 2.
(Michie Supp. 2001) (alluding to an "appearance of impropriety" standard). See also Leslie
Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge's Impartiality "Might Reasonably
Be Questioned," 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55 (2000).
4 Compare KY. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E (I), Sup. CT. R. 4.300, Ky. R. AN. Vol. 2.
(Michie Supp. 2001) ("judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned").
41 See FLAmM, supra note 9, § 30.84, at 962-63.
48 Id. at 963.
49 id.
-o See generally id. at 963.
5' 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
52 Id. at45.
13 555 F.2d 1036 (1977).
4See id. at 1042-43.
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prosecuting personnel are precluded only from participating in the adjudication
of cases in which they have actually performed such functions, and in 'factually
related' cases."55 Unless he had actually personally supervised the INS attorneys
who argued against the petitioners in the case, or had knowledge or familiarity
with this or any other case arising out of the same transaction, he was not
disqualified or participating improperly.
5 6
Then there are procedural questions. The party seeking disqualification
must seek it in a timely manner, "upon discovery of facts establishing grounds."
57
The quoted words should be read to mean "as soon as practicable after a party
has reasonable cause to believe that such [grounds] exist.""8 Failure to make a
timely motion will presumably be treated as a waiver.59 Presumably an appeal of
a decision not to disqualify will have to await a final administrative
adjudication. 0 On appeal, one assumes that it must be shown that there was an
abuse of discretion in deciding the motion.6 ,
D. Code of Judicial Conduct
Ever since the rise of administrative law in the 1930s there have been
efforts to "judicialize the process." 62 It has already been noted that dissatisfaction
with the combination of adjudicatory and prosecutorial functions in many
agencies led to a greater separation for federal administrative law judges (ALJs)
under the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 3 The APA ushered in
the modem administrative hearing, which incorporated the essential elements of
the judicial model.64 That federal ALJs are perceived to be comparable to trial
judges was recognized by the Supreme Court in Butz v. Economou.65 To the
extent that the administrative law official is performing in a judicial or quasi-
judicial role, should the Code of Judicial Conduct apply?
66
Originally, the answer seemed to be "no," because administrative
officials are operating under the authority of the executive, and therefore they are
not judicial officers.67 Furthermore, their decisions are recommendations which
51Id. at 1043.
56 id.
57 See FLAMM, supra note 9, § 30.7, at 956 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 556 (b) (1982)).
58 See FLAMM, supra note 9, § 30.7, at 956.
59 See FLAMM, supra note 9, § 30.72, at 956; cf Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13B.020 (6) (Michie 1996
& Supp. 2000); Gibson v. F.T.C., 682 F.2d 554 (1982), reh 'g granted, 688 F.2d 840 (5th Cir. 1982)
(waiver under the federal APA).
60 See FLAMM, supra note 9, § 30.7, at 956.
61 See FLAMM, supra note 9, § 30.10.2, at 965.
62 See AMAN, supra note 8, § 8.5.1, at 239-42.
63 See AMAN, supra note 8, § 8.5.2, at 242.
64 See generally AMAN, supra note 8, § 8.5.2, at 243.
65 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978).
66 Once again, since investigative and adjudicative responsibilities are frequently combined in a
single agency in the administrative context (though not in a judicial context, where the Code of
Judicial Conduct applies), it may be permissible for one who possesses personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts to sit in judgment. At least, this is so as a matter of constitutional due
process. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
67 See Karen Lewis, Administrative Law Judges and The Code Of Judicial Conduct: A Need For
Regulated Ethics, 94 DICK. L. REV. 929, 938, 947 (1990) [hereinafter Lewis].
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can be overturned by agency higher ups. 68 So in some jurisdictions, efforts to
apply the Code of Judicial Conduct directly were rejected.69 Other states applied
the Code of Judicial Conduct by analogy, at least in some contexts. 70 Perhaps
sensing a need to foster public credibility in the administrative process, the ABA
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility offered a
proposed (1989-90) revision of the Code of Judicial Conduct containing the
following footnote:
Applicability of this Code to administrative law judges should
be determined by each adopting jurisdiction. Administrative
law judges generally are affiliated with the executive branch of
government rather than the judicial branch and each adopting
jurisdiction should consider the unique characteristics of
particular administrative law judge positions in adopting and
adapting the Code for administrative law judges.
This footnote is consistent with the views expressed in an earlier ABA
opinion 7' which noted that the applicability of the Code to the state
administrative law process depends on all the facts and circumstances.72 State
bar ethics opinions (and judicial ethics opinions) are consistent with this to the
extent that they are "all over the boards. 73
In the past the Ethics Committee of the Kentucky Judiciary74 has taken
the position that a lawyer serving as a hearing officer for an administrative body
would not be serving as an officer of the judicial branch of government and
would not be subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct.7' Following this logic, the
Ethics Committee of the Kentucky Judiciary declined to issue an ethics opinion
in response to a request from a hearing examiner for a city's human rights
commission and referred the lawyer/examiner's question to the Kentucky Bar
Association Ethics Committee.76 Our high court could apply the Code of Judicial
Conduct by analogy when reviewing agency decisions,77 or leave it to the
legislature or agency decision makers to either adopt or reject the Code of
Judicial Conduct 78 or develop similar rules consistent with powers granted by
68 See id. at 947.
69 See generally Levinson, supra note 3, at 256. See also Lewis, supra note 66, at 954.
70 See Lewis, supra note 67, at 936.
71 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1522 (1986).
72 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1522 (1986) (holding that
federal ALJs are "judges" and are covered by the Code of Judicial Conduct). See Levinson, supra
note 3, at 255.
73 See generally Judith Meierhenry, The Due Process Right to an Unbiased Adjudicator in
Administrative Proceedings, 36 S.D. L. REv. 551 (1991). See also Lewis, supra note 67.
74 Kentucky's Supreme Court Rules authorize an Ethics Committee of the Kentucky Judiciary to
render formal and informal advisory opinions. See Sui. CT. R. 4.310, Ky. R. ANN. Vol. 2. (Michie
Supp. 2001).75 See Ky. Bar Ass'n Ethics Committee Op. E-402 (1997).
76 See Ky. Bar Ass'n Ethics Committee Op. E-398 (1997). All of the Kentucky Ethics, Judicial
Ethics, and Unauthorized Practice opinions cited in this article are collected in full text in
KENTUCKY LEGAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DESKBooK (Todd Eberle and
Richard Underwood, eds., 2d ed. 1999).
77 See Levinson, supra note 3, at 226.7 1 Id. at 230.
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enabling statutes.7 9 The chief ALJ or hearing officer in a central panel or cluster
might have the authority to adopt the Code of Judicial Conduct in whole or in
part. 0 'It seems unlikely that the Court would attempt to impose the Code of
Judicial Conduct directly. on any administrative body because of the concept of
separation of powers or because of considerations of comity."'
In Kentucky, some administrative adjudicators are calling for the direct
application of the Code of Judicial Conduct, or a derivative of the Code, to at
least some types of hearing officers. I attach a copy of a non-final draft of a
"Proposed Code of Judicial Conduct for Hearing Officers" developed by the
Ethics Committee of the Kentucky Association of Administrative Adjudicators. 2
These rules were based in part on the Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct, 3 the
ABA-NCALJ Model Canons, and the Canons of the National Association of
Administrative Law'Judges. 4
I think that the adoption of such a proposed Code - at least Canons 1
through 3, would be a positive development, at least in the context of Chapter
13B proceedings. Does the Code add anything that is not already present in KRS
13B.040" s [Qualifications of hearing officer]? The answer is clearly - "Yes."
Consider all of the questions I raised but did not answer, with respect to
KRS 13B.040 regarding personal bias, personal knowledge of facts, relational
interests, and so forth. The "Proposed Code of Judicial Conduct for Hearing
Officers," would provide some answers to these questions.86 It provides for
disqualification when the hearing officer's impartiality might reasonably be
questioned17 in instances when: (1) the hearing officer has personal bias or
prejudice or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts;88 (2) the hearing
officer served as a lawyer or representative in the matter in controversy;8 9 (3) the
79 Id.
80 Id. at 235.
s1 Id. at 229 (discussing state and federal constitutional limitations on judicial and legislative
powers).
See Appendix.
83 See KY. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, SUP. CT. R. 4.300, Ky. R. ANN. Vol. 2. (Michie Supp.
2001).
84 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES, available at
<http://www.naalj.com/my/*20site/mcjcsalj.htm>.85 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13B.040 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2000).
86 See Appendix.
87 See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR HEARING OFFICERS § 3 E (1) (Ky. Ass'n of Admin.
Adjudicators, Proposed 2001), reprinted in Appendix; cf KENTUCKY CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,
SUP. CT. R. 4.300, Canon 3 E (1), KY. RULES ANN. Vol. 2 (Michie 2001) (stating: "A judge shall
disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be
auestioned .... ).
See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR HEARING OFFICERS § 3 E (1) (a) (Ky. Ass'n of Admin.
Adjudicators, Proposed 2001), reprinted in Appendix; cf KENTUCKY CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,
Sup. CT. R. 4.300, Canon 3 E (I) (a), KY. RULES ANN. Vol. 2 (Michie 2001) (stating: "[A judge
shall disqualify himself if the] judge has ... a personal bias or prejudice.., or personal knowledge
of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding."). See also MODEL CODE OF ETIHCS § III
(Nat'l Ass'n of Hearing Officers), available at <http://www.naho.org/code-of ethics.htm>
(stating: "Personal knowledge of the facts in a case is an appropriate ground for disqualification of
the hearing official.").
89 See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR HEARING OFFICERS § 3 E (I) (b) (Ky. Ass'n of Admin.
Adjudicators, Proposed 2001), reprinted in Appendix; cf. KENTUCKY CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,
SuP. CT. R. 4.300, Canon 3 E (1) (b), KY. RULES ANN. Vol. 2 (Michie 2001) (stating: "[A judge
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hearing officer or a close relative has an interest in the subject matter or
controversy; 90 or, (4) the hearing officer or a close relative is a party to the
proceeding or appears as a lawyer in the proceeding.9' Given the lack of
uniformity in the case law, it would be helpful if we adopted some clear rules like
those contained in Canon 3, so that we could avoid litigating all of these issues
on a subjective and ad hoc basis.
Still, some amendments and deletions to the Proposed Code may be
advisable. Is the definition of "hearing officer" too broad? There are hearing
officers and then there are hearing officers. Some are exempt from KRS 13B.92 I
do not think that it is necessary or appropriate to apply the standards of the Code
of Judicial Conduct to all administrative adjudicators. However, that may not be
the intent of the drafters of the Code. Perhaps this is a Code only for KRS 13B
hearing officers. One also wonders how you deal with agency heads and other
officials who have special and multiple roles.93 Of course, this is a voluntary
code at this point. The individual agencies will presumably have something to
say about its applicability.
I also wonder about the need for and practicality of Canons 4 and 5 in the
administrative context.94 I note that the Model Code of Ethics of the National
Association of Hearing Officials does not attempt to incorporate the elaborate
shall disqualify himself if the] judge served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer
with whom the judge previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer
concerning the matter .... ).
90 See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR HEARING OFFICERS § 3 E (1) (c) (Ky. Ass'n of Admin.
Adjudicators, Proposed 2001), reprinted in Appendix; cf KENTUCKY CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,
SUP. CT. R. 4.300, Canon 3 E (I) (c), Ky. RULES ANN. Vol. 2 (Michie 2001) (stating: "[A judge
shall disqualify himself if the] judge . . .or the judge's [close relative] has . . .more than a de
minimis interest ... that could be substantially affected by the proceeding.").
91 See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR HEARING OFFICERS § 3 E (I) (d) (Ky. Ass'n of Admin.
Adjudicators, Proposed 2001), reprinted in Appendix; cf KENTUCKY CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,
SUP. CT. R. 4.300, Canon 3 E (1) (d), KY. RULES ANN. Vol. 2 (Michie 2001) (for disqualification
when the judge's spouse or other close relative is a witness, a lawyer in the proceeding and so on).
See also Ky. Judicial Ethics Op. JE- I (finding disqualification when judge's son appearing as a
lawyer); Ky. Judicial Ethics Op. JE-8 (finding disqualification when judge's son is assistant
Commonwealth attorney); Ky. Judicial Ethics Op. JE-69 (finding disqualification when judge's ex-
wife is a witness). According to the Comments to the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge is not
necessarily disqualified just because a lawyer appearing before him is associated in practice with
the judge's lawyer-relative. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 E (1) commentary
(1990).
92 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13B.020 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2000).
93 Cf. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §554 (d) (2) (C), supra note 41.
94 Compare MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4 (1990) (dealing with a judge's extra-
judicial activities) and MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (1990) (dealing with a judge's
political activities) with CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR HEARING OFFICERS Canons 4 and 5 (Ky.
Ass'n of Admin. Adjudicators, Proposed 2001), reprinted in Appendix. See also CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT FOR HEARING OFFICERS § 4 G (Ky. Ass'n of Admin. Adjudicators, Proposed 2001)
(describing the limits on the hearing officer's ability to practice law), reprinted in Appendix. None
of these canons seem terribly restrictive, and yet § 4 G (3) may be more restrictive than some of the
current ethics opinions. Compare CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR HEARING OFFICERS § 4 G (3)
(Ky. Ass'n of Admin. Adjudicators, Proposed 2001) (stating: "The hearing officer shall not
practice law before the administrative body for which the hearing officer serves as hearing
officer."), reprinted in Appendix, with Ky Bar Ass'n Ethics Committee Op. E-398 (1997) (stating
that a lawyer in private practice may serve as a hearing officer for her local Human Rights
Commission, and also practice before the Commission).
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provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct relating to civic, political, and
business activities.9
E. Ex Parte Communications
The question of ex parte communications seems to come up frequently.
Apparently some have been so bold as to suggest that "ex parte contacts in
Kentucky are, or should be, the 'bread and butter' of administrative proceedings
to be tolerated with a knowing wink. 96 However, this cynical proposition was
rejected with considerable judicial indignation in Louisville Gas and Electric
Company v. Commonwealth. 7
The right to a fair hearing includes the notion that one has to have a
reasonable opportunity to know the claims and contentions of the opposing party
and to meet them.98 Therefore, we have the fundamental rule regarding the
"exclusivity of the record."99 The administrative tribunal should take nothing
into consideration that has not been introduced in the record.' ° The rule that the
administrative adjudicator should not communicate exparte with any party or its
representatives concerning the merits, except upon notice to all parties, is a
corollary to all of this.'01  Ex parte communications can lead to the
disqualification of the administrative decision maker, 10 2 and may, in some
circumstances, result in a reversal of a decision rendered by an administrative
tribunal.' 0 3 But administrative adjudicators are frequently exposed to unsolicited
95 See MODEL CODE OF ETHICS (Nat'l Ass'n of Hearing Officers), available at
<http://www.naho.org/code-of ethics.htm>.
96 Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commonwealth, 862 S.W.2d 897, 901 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).
9 See id.
98 See FLAMM, supra note 9, § 30.5.7.1, at 949.
" See AMAN, supra note 8, § 8.5.3.
1oo See FLAMM, supra note 9, § 30.5.7.1, at 949.
101 See Ky. Bar Ass'n Ethics Committee Op. E-402 (1997), reprinted in Richard Underwood,
Advisory Ethics Opinions, KY. BENCH & BAR 52, 56, 58-59 (Spring 1997). For good general
references regarding the rules governing ex pane communications and the procedures followed
when one must deal with violations of the rules, see FLAMM, supra note 9, §30.5.7. See also Leslie
Abramson, The Judicial Ethics of Ex Parte and Other Communications, 37 Hous. L. REv. 1343
(2000); Cornelius Peck, Regulation and Control of Ex Parte Communications with Administrative
Agencies, 76 HARV. L. REv. 233 (1962); Note, Ex Parte Contacts Under the Constitution and
Administrative Procedure Act, 80 COLuM. L. REv. 379 (1980). See also National Association of
Hearing Officers Model Code of Ethics:
Ex Pane Communication: 1. Hearing officials should have a strong working knowledge
of their jurisdiction's definitions and restrictions on ex pane contact. Generally, "ex
pane" refers to communication between a hearing official and fewer than all parties to an
administrative hearing. 2. Hearing officials should not receive information from any
party without sharing that information with all parties ....
MODEL CODE OF ETHICS § V (Nat'l Ass'n of Hearing Officers), available at
<http://www.naho.org/code_of ethics.htm>.
102 See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13B.040 (2) (b) (2) (Michie Supp. 2000).
103 See Louisville Gas and Elec. Co. v. Commonwealth, 862 S.W.2d 897, 900 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993)
(ex parte contacts make administrative agencies' decisions voidable); cf. Nat'l-Southwire
Aluminum Co. v. Big Rivers Elec. Corp., 785 S.W.2d 503, 515 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990) (finding no
reversible error where ex pane contacts were with each party for purposes of mediation and fact-
finding).
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ex parte communications, and not every such contact should be disqualifying.4
Ordinarily, reversible error will only be found where the-complaining party has
been materially prejudiced.'0 5 On the other hand, Flamm contends that it is
appropriate to place the burden of demonstrating that a prohibited
communication was not prejudicial on the challenged administrator.'0 6
KRS 13B.100[Prohibited communications], which prohibits ex parte
communications, provides:
(1) Unless required for the disposition of ex parte matters
specifically authorized by statute, a hearing officer shall not
communicate off the record with any party to the hearing or any
other person who has a direct or indirect interest in the outcome
of the hearing, concerning any substantive issue, while the
proceeding is pending.
(2) The prohibition stated in subsection (1) shall not apply to:
(a) Communication with other agency staff, if the
communication is not an ex parte communication received by
staff; and
(b) Communication among members of a collegial body or
panel which by law is serving as a hearing officer.
(3) If an ex parte communication occurs, the hearing officer
shall note the occurrence for the record, and he shall place in
the record a copy of the communication, if it was written, or a
memorandum of the substance of the communication, if it was
oral.
07
All of this may seem simple and familiar to the practitioner. On the
other hand, it has been suggested that the definition of prohibited exparte contact
under the Kentucky caselaw may be broader than that contained in either the
federal APA or KRS 13B - the warning being "if there is any doubt, the matter
should be treated as a prohibited exparte contact."108
As Chairman of the KBA Ethics Committee, and as a Professor of Law, I
have encountered a problem with judges who call experts to obtain assistance
without notifying all parties in the matter. This may get judges and
administrative adjudicators in trouble. The Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct
104 See FLAMM, supra note 9, § 30.5.7.3, at 952.
205 See id.
"o See FLAMM, supra note 9 § 30.5.7.3, at 952. On the other hand, we do not ordinarily require a
Ferson or party to prove a negative.
07 Ky. lEv. STAT. ANN. § 13B. 100 (Michie 1996). The federal APA contains similar prohibitions
at 5 U.S.C. §557(dX I). See AMAN, supra note 8, § 8.5.3 and text accompanying note 8.
10s KENTUCKY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 6, §§ 6.30-6.31 (citing Louisville Gas and Elec.
Co. v. Commonwealth, 862 S.W.2d 897, 900-01 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993)).
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provides that "a judge may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law
applicable to a proceeding before the judge."'1 9 However, the ABA versions of
the Code of Judicial Conduct require that the judge give "notice to the parties of
the person consulted and the substance of the advice, and afford ... the parties
reasonable opportunity to respond.""0 I have always declined to opine unless the
ABA procedures are followed. Certainly, there should be no ex parte contacts
with experts regarding factual matters or matters that are not purely questions of
law."'
Just prior to my presentation" 2 I was asked a question that seems to be
related to the problem of ex parte communication or institutional bias or both.
Specifically, I was asked whether the executive director of an administrative
agency may participate, or even be present, during the "Board's" consideration of
a disciplinary matter while in executive session. What are the risks here -
combination of functions and bias, or ex parte communications, or both?" 3 If the
person is not a member of the body or panel that is serving as the hearing officer,
what is he or she doing there, and are comments that he or she might make
prohibited by KRS 13B.100?' 4 Is this just a way for an "interested party" to
influence the decision maker? Certainly there is an appearance of impropriety."'
Perhaps I am missing something, but the scenario does not pass my "smell test."
When I made similar comments at the training session,16 1 received no response
from the audience, but mine may not be the last word on this practice.
F. Confidentiality
109 KENTUCKY CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, SUP. CT. R. 4.300, Canon 3 B (7) (b), Ky. RULES ANN.
Vol. 2 (Michie 2001).
110 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 B (7) (b) (1990). It is not clear why the Kentucky
version does not explicitly mention these procedures. Perhaps the draftspersons were of the
opinion that the judge should be able to get the "law," as opposed to other forms of expertise
wherever he or she can find it, without notice to the parties. But as Professor Abramson points out,
the Kentucky version of the Code of Judicial Conduct deprives the parties of any opportunity to
cross-examine the expert in order to bring out the expert's biases or prejudices. See Leslie
Abramson, The Judicial Ethics of Ex Parte and Other Communications, 37 Hous. L. REv. 1343,
1372-73, n.112 (2000).
11 See National Association of Hearing Officers Model Code of Ethics: "If hearing officials are
authorized to consult with an expert, the nature of the consultation and the substance of the expert's
advice must be disclosed to all parties. Hearing officials should also give all parties an opportunity
to respond." MODEL CODE OF ETHICS § V (3) (Nat'l Ass'n of Hearing Officers), available at
<http://www.naho.org/codeofethics.htm>.
"
2 See Underwood, supra note 2.
113 See AMAN, supra note 8, § 8.5.4, at 248.
1 4 See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13B. 100 (Michie 1996).
"' See Louisville Gas and Elec. Co. v. Commonwealth, 862 S.W.2d 897, 900 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993)
(expressing at least some concern with "protecting the integrity of the administrative process,
which includes the question of the appearance of impropriety . . . ."); cf National Association of
Hearing Officers Model Code of Ethics: "[Slupervisors may provide consultation to hearing
officials, except as prohibited by law, but may not alter the hearing officials' decisions or substitute
their judgment for that of the hearing officials." MODEL CODE OF ETHICS § IV (Nat'l Ass'n of
Hearing Officers), available at <http://www.naho.org/code-of ethics.htrn>. See also Section V(2),
Ex Parte Communication: "Hearing officials should not receive information from any party
without sharing that information with all parties."
"1
6 See Underwood, supra note 2.
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It might be helpful if any Proposed Code for Hearing Officers also
addressed the issue of confidentiality. For example, Kentucky Rule of
Professional Conduct (KRPC) 1.11 (b) and (c) recognize that a lawyer serving as
a public officer or employee may acquire "confidential government information"
- information about a person, obtained under government authority - which ought
not be disclosed.' 7 In this regard, the National Association of Hearing Officers
Model Code, Section IX contains the following useful language:
Confidentiality
1. Hearing officials should not disclose confidential or private
information obtained by reason of official position or authority
except as required by law.
2. Hearing officials should never seek to use such confidential
information to further their personal interests ....
4. Hearing officials should avoid ex parte communications with
anyone (including family, friends, and agency staff and
associates) unless authorized by statute or agency regulations.
However, hearing officials may in confidence discuss cases
with other hearing officials."'
8
G. The Revolving Door - Negotiating for Private Employment
Most practitioners are familiar with the problem of the "revolving
door."" 9 Lawyers in Washington, and to a lesser extent in Frankfort, go in and
out of government service in administrative agencies, lobbying or appearing
before their former agencies. Conflicts of interest and other abuses associated
with the revolving door are addressed in Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct
1.11 [Successive government and private employment]. 20 To the extent that a
lawyer working for an agency is also an adjudicator, the lawyer should also
consider KRPC 1.12, which deals with the conflicts of former judges and
arbitrators.12 ' Perhaps the most overlooked provision of the latter is KRPC
1.12(b), which provides that a lawyer serving as a judge or arbitrator shall not
negotiate for private employment with any party or attorney for a party appearing
before him in a matter. I do not know whether this scenario has presented any
117 See KY. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11 (b), (c), SuP. CT. R. 3.130, Ky. RULES
ANN. Vol. 2 (Michie 2001).
118 MODEL CODE OF ETHICS § IX (Nat'l Ass'n of Hearing Officers), available' at
<http://www.naho.org/codeof ethics.htm>.
" 9 See generally KOCH, supra note 42, § 6.20 (2), at 340-42; § 6.22 (3) (e), at 348-49.
120 See KY. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1. 11, Sup. CT. R. 3.130, Ky. RULES ANN. Vol.
2 (Michie 2001).
121 See Ky. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1. 12, Sup. CT. R. 3.130, Ky. RULES ANN. Vol.
2 (Michie 2001).
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problems for Kentucky ALJ's or hearing officers. However, I am reminded of a
case in Kentucky in which a confident lawyer waited a very long time for
findings of fact and conclusions of law in a case that he was sure he was going to
win. When he finally received them he was shocked at the outcome, and even
more shocked to discover that the judge had resigned the next day after issuing
them to take a job with the winning firm. I do not know if there was any fallout
from this peculiar set of "circumstances."
III. THE ETHICS OF THE REPRESENTATIVE
A. The ABA Model Code and Model Rules
The provisions of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility apply
to lawyers appearing before administrative agencies in adjudicatory
proceedings. 22 The definitions section of the Model Code defines "tribunal" as
including "all courts and all other adjudicatory bodies.' 2 a Furthermore, EC 7-15
provides that "[w]here the applicable rules of the agency impose specific
obligations upon a lawyer, it is his duty to comply therewith, unless the lawyer
has a legitimate basis for challenging the validity thereof."' 24  Prior to the
adoption of the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct, Kentucky lawyers were
disciplined under the Code for misconduct in administrative proceedings.
12
Now Kentucky has a version of the Model Rules. 126 The Rules apply to
lawyers appearing before administrative agencies, although it takes some effort
to find the controlling language. 27 Unfortunately, the definitions section of the
Rules does not include a definition of "tribunal."'128 However, Rule 3.9 provides
that a lawyer appearing as an advocate "before a legislative or administrative
tribunal in a nonadjudicative proceeding" must still follow "the provisions of
Rules 3.3(a) through (c), 3.4(a) through (c) and 3.5.,,129 So it would seem to
follow that a lawyer appearing as an advocate in an adjudicative, trial-type,
administrative proceeding would have all of the obligations under the Rules as a
lawyer appearing before a court. 30 EC 7-15 is restated in Model Rule 3.4(c): "A
lawyer shall not: (c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a
'22 See generally MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preamble and Preliminary
Statement (198 1).
123 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (6) (1981).
124 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-15 (1981).
125 See, e.g., Ky. Bar Ass'n v. Nail, 599 S.W.2d 899 (Ky. 1980) (a referral to disciplinary authorities
led to discipline).
126 The Kentucky Rules of Professional conduct became effective January 1, 1990. See KENTUCKY
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Sup. CT. R. 3.130, Ky. RULES ANN. Vol. 2 (Michie 2001).
127 See e.g., KENTUCKY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1. 11 cmt. 2, Sup. CT. R. 3.130, Ky.
RULES ANN. Vol. 2 (Michie 2001) ("A lawyer representing a government agency... is subject to
the Rules of Professional Conduct .... ").
128 See KENTUCKY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, SUP. CT. R. 3.130, Ky. RULES ANN. Vol. 2
(Michie 2001).
129 KENTUCKY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.9, Sup. CT. R. 3.130, Ky. RULES ANN.
Vol. 2 (Michie 2001) (emphasis added).
130 See Levinson, supra note 3, at 226.
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tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation
exist...,,31 For its part, the Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers (Third)
provides in pertinent part:
A lawyer representing a client before a legislative or
administrative agency... (2) must comply with applicable law
and regulations governing such representations; and (3) except
as applicable law otherwise provides: (a) in an adjudicative
proceeding before a government agency or involving an agency
as a participant, has the legal rights and responsibilities of an
advocate in a proceeding before a judicial tribunal ....
In summary, the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct apply to
lawyers practicing before state administrative agencies in adjudicative
proceedings, and the rules of the agency may also impose additional standards or
obligations to the tribunal through Rule 3.4(c).
3
1
One controversial issue in federal administrative practice has to do with
the power of a federal agency to hold a lawyer to regulatory duties that appear to
conflict with the ethics rules, for example, Rule 1.6 (Confidentiality of
Information). 34 As we shall see below, the power of a Kentucky agency to
impose additional obligations in conflict with the Kentucky Rules of Professional
Conduct would be limited by the doctrine of separation of powers.'
3
C. Enforcement
Before addressing the problem of enforcement of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, I would like to point out some distinctions between the
power to admit or "disbar" persons to practice before an agency, the power to
discipline an advocate, and the power to exclude an advocate as a means of
punishing misconduct or controlling the proceedings. This gets confusing
because the rules are different in the state and federal systems. We also need to
address the question of whether administrative adjudicators have the equivalent
of the judicial contempt power.
Regarding admission of attorneys to practice, in Kentucky the license to
practice law also admits the lawyer to practice before state administrative
131 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4 (c) (2000).
132 RESTATEMENT (TnRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 104 (2000).
133 See KENTUCKY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4 (c), Sup. CT. R. 3.130, Ky. RULES
ANN. Vol. 2 (Michie 2001).
134 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (2000). See also Nancy Combs,
Understanding Kay Scholar: The Autonomous Citizen, the Managed Subject and the Role of the
Lawyer, 82 CAL. L. REv. 663-716 (1993), cited in CHARLES KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 6.22 (1) (2d ed. 1997). 1 am not as confident as the author of this comment that federal
agencies do not have some power here. If the agency is acting pursuant to its statutory authority,
then it seems to me that the federal law trumps state ethics rules, notwithstanding the curious
language of Comment [20] to Model Rule 1.6: "The lawyer must comply with the final orders of a
court or other tribunal of competent jurisdiction requiring the lawyer to give information about the
client." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. 20 (2000).
135 See discussion infra part IV.C.
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tribunals.'3 6 Under federal law, the lawyer's Kentucky license also automatically
admits the lawyer to practice before federal agencies, 3 7 except for the Patent and
Trademark Office which may impose its own standards for attorney admission.
138
Regarding admission of non-lawyers, Kentucky agencies have no power to admit
laymen. 39 In marked contrast, federal agencies do have, and in fact exercise, the
power to admit non-lawyers according to the agency's own-admissions criteria. 4 °
Federal agencies may also have the statutory authority to suspend
lawyers from practice before them.' 4' Technically speaking, a Kentucky
administrative adjudicator has no power to suspend or "disbar" a lawyer.
42
However, a hearing officer has the authority and duty to maintain order during
the prehearing 143 and hearing'" stages of the adjudication. While a hearing
officer may not have the contempt power, 45 a hearing officer may exclude
counsel for disruptive behavior,146 may disqualify counsel for conflicts of
136 See Levinson, supra note 3, at 221.
'"See 5 U.S.C. § 500 (a) (2), (b) (1994).
138 See 5 U.S.C. § 500 (e) (Supp. 1999).
See infra text accompanying notes 167-68.
140 See 5 U.S.C. § 500 (c) (1994) (providing for certified public accountant to represent a person
before the Internal Revenue Service). See also 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.0-10.97 (2000) (describing
regulation of practice before the Internal Revenue Service); Levinson, supra note 3, at 253.
141 See KocH, supra note 41, § 6.23 (2). See also Levinson, supra note 3, at 247 (citing Polydoroff
v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 773 F.2d 372 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (upholding power of the Interstate
Commerce Commission to suspend two practitioners for six months for violation of the canons of
ethics contained in the ICC's rules)); Jaskiewicz v. Mossinghoff, 822 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(upholding the Patent and Trademark Office's suspension of an attorney for filing misleading
information and other "inequitable conduct").
142 Consider Ky. Bar Ass'n Ethics Committee Op. E-32 (1967), in which the Kentucky Bar
Association Ethics Committee reasoned that a judge may dispose of unethical conduct through the
contempt power, but that "[d]isciplinary actions relating to a reprimand, suspension, or disbarment
rest solely and exclusively in the Court of Appeals [now the Supreme Court]." Id. (citing In re
Wehrman, 327 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1959). That much of the opinion makes sense. However, the
Committee went on to opine that a judge of a "minor court" had no right to pass judgment on the
ethical conduct of a member of the bar, except through contempt proceedings. That strikes me as a
questionable proposition at best. Judges may take disciplinary actions against lawyers who practice
before them, including reprimands, sanctions, and even exclusion, and may refer unethical conduct
to the Bar Counsel. Compare KENTUCKY CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, SUP. CT. R. 4.300, Canon 3
D (1) - (3), Ky. RULES ANN. Vol. 2 (Michie 2001) (providing that a judge who knows of substantial
likelihood that a judge or attorney has violated applicable rules of the Kentucky Code of Judicial
Conduct "should inform the appropriate authority.") with KENTUCKY CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,
SUP. CT. R. 4.300, Comment to Cannon 3D, Ky. RULES ANN. Vol. 2 (Michie 2001) (stating
"appropriate action may include direct communication with the judge or lawyer .... ). The
quibble factor in KBA E-32 seems to be over what we mean when we use the word "discipline."
,43 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13B.070 (1) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2000).
'4 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13B.080 (i) (Michie 1996).
145 The power to punish for contempt is "inherent in every court." See Underhill v. Murphy, 78
S.W. 482, 484 (Ky. 1904). However, an administrative hearing officer is not, strictly speaking, a
judicial officer. Some state and federal courts have concluded that the contempt power may only
be exercised by a judicial court. See Levinson, supra note 3, at 247-48, collecting the conflicting
precedents; cf KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13B.080 (3) (Michie 1996) (stating that a subpoena from a
hearing officer may be enforced by an application to the Circuit Court for an order for compliance;
noncompliance with such an order may then be treated as a contempt of court). See also Levinson,
pra note 3, at 239.
See Levinson, supra note 3, at 242-44.
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interest, 147 and may also treat noncompliance with orders and disruptive behavior
as grounds for a default order, resulting in a grant or denial of relief.
148
Furthermore, the hearing officer can and should refer instances of unethical
behavior to bar counsel.
49
It is assumed that most hearing officers would prefer to address
misbehavior with warnings and referrals to the state bar. More serious and
immediate action will require an adequate record. Furthermore, the Kentucky
hearing officer has a limited number of options. Exclusion and default are drastic
remedies. If counsel is excluded, the hearing officer may have to give the
represented party a reasonable time to obtain substitute counsel.' °
IV. UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE ISSUES
A. Lay ALJs and Hearing Officers
One of the questions I was asked to address at the training conference
was whether hearing officers must be admitted to the bar. I assume that in most
states, including Kentucky, the answer is no. Constitutional "due process" does
not require ALJs or hearing officers to be admitted to the bar.'' That should not
be surprising given the breadth of the term "hearing officer." 52 Think of all the
boards and commissions that perform quasi-judicial activities without the benefit
of lawyer decision makers.' Also, I refer the reader to my least favorite
unauthorized practice opinion, KBA U-34 (198 1).154 That curious opinion came
out of the university setting, and held that non-lawyer students and faculty maZ
not represent others in university grievance and disciplinary proceedings.
1
4 7 Id. The power to disqualify counsel is thought to be inherent in every tribunal, and is implied by
statutes that prohibit conflicts of interest, [e.g. Rules of Professional Conduct] and requirements of
due process. Id. (citing Brown v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 413 A.2d
1276 (D.C. App. 1980)).
14 See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13B.080 (6) (Michie 1996).
149 See Ky. Bar Ass'n v. Nail, 599 S.W.2d 899 (Ky. 1980). See also KENTUCKY CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT, SUP. CT. R. 4.300, Canon 3 D (2), Ky. RULES ANN. Vol. 2 (Michie 2001) and the
identical provisions of the Kentucky Association of Administrative Adjudicator's Proposed Code of
Judicial Conduct for Hearing Officers. See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR HEARING OFFICERS § 3
D (2) (Ky. Ass'n of Admin. Adjudicators, Proposed 2001), reprinted in Appendix. See also the
National Association of Hearing Officers Model Code, Section X: Compliance with Ethical Rules:
"Hearing officials have a duty to report ethical violations." MODEL CODE OF ETHICS § X (Nat'l
Ass'n of Hearing Officers), available at <http://www.naho.org/code-of ethics.htn>.
'50 See Levinson, supra note 3, at 243-44.
151 See Levinson, supra note 3, at 260 (citing, among other cases and materials, Schweiker v.
McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982)).
152 See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR HEARING OFFICERS (Ky. Ass'n of Admin. Adjudicators,
Proposed 2001) (stating: "'Hearing officer' includes any person to whom the authority to conduct
an administrative adjudication has been delegated by the administrative agency or by statute.")
(emphasis added), reprinted in Appendix.
153 See e.g., Kentucky's state licensing boards, local planning and zoning boards, etc.
15 See Ky. Bar Ass'n Unauthorized Practice Comm. Op. U-34 (1981).
' See id. This opinion was in direct conflict with law school honor code rules, which allowed
students to represent other students in proceedings.
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However, the opinion also seems to assume that a non-lawyer might be the
hearing officer.' 6 Specifically, it stated that if the hearing officer is a lawyer
(but presumably not otherwise), he or she must report non-lawyers who are
attempting to appear and play lawyer, or risk being charged with aiding the
unauthorized practice of law.'
57
In Kentucky the unauthorized practice rule, SCR 3.020 (Practice of Law
defined) is spectacularly broad: "The practice of law is any service rendered
involving legal knowledge or legal advice, whether representation, counsel or
advocacy in or out of court, rendered in respect to the rights, duties, obligations,
liabilities, or business relations of one requiring the service .... ,,58 So far the
KBA Unauthorized Practice Committee has not attempted to "outlaw" non-
lawyer hearing officers, but it may be a temptation.'59
I do think it is interesting that KRS 13B.030 (2) (b) allows an agency to
contract "with private attorneys" in order to secure hearing officers if the
Attorney General can't provide them. 60 Does that mean that being an attorney is
a minimum qualification? Apparently not. KRS 13B.030 (3) states: "A hearing
officer shall possess and meet qualifications as the Personnel Cabinet and the
employing agency, with the advice of the division, may find necessary to assure
competency in the conduct of an administrative hearing."' 6' KRS 13B.030 (4)
then goes on to require no more than 18 hours of initial training plus six hours of
additional annual training. 62  The Attorney General has issued regulations
clarifying the nature of this training.163 Professor Levinson argues that non-
lawyer hearing officers or ALJ's should be required (by the employing agency or
central panel chief) to follow the same standards as lawyer hearing officers or
ALJs even if they are not subject to bar association discipline. 64
'57 id. See also Ky. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.5 (b), SUP. CT. R. 3.130, KY. RULES
ANN. Vol. 2 (Michie 2001) (prohibiting a lawyer from assisting "a person who is not a member of
the bar in the performance of activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.").
"s' Sup. CT. R. 3.020, Ky. RuLEs ANN. Vol. 2 (Michie 2001).
159 One interesting example suffices to illustrate the possibility of abuse under the rule. Many years
ago Elvis Stahr, Jr., who was something of a Kentucky luminary, became Dean of the University of
Kentucky College of Law. He was invited to join the bar, but under the terms of the admissions
rules he would have had to take the bar examination (horrors!). To facilitate his admission on
motion, the rules were changed to count years of prior law teaching as years of practice for
"experience purposes". (My source for this background information was Professor Paul Oberst,
who retired some years back.) Unfortunately, the rule as amended has led some to assume that
since "law teaching is law practice," then it must follow that all law teachers in Kentucky must be
admitted to the Kentucky Bar. Again, this was not the intent of the rule, and one doubts the power
of the bar to enforce such an interpretation. In any event, the notion that only members of the
Kentucky Bar Association may teach law in Kentucky only comes up when some unfortunate
professor makes some lawyer or judge mad. Kentucky's Supreme Court Rules include instructors
or professors of law in Kentucky law schools as a form of the practice of law. See SuP. CT. R. 3.022
(c), KY. RULES ANN. Vol. 2 (Michie 2001).
'
60 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13B.030 (2) (b) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2000).
161 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13B.030 (3) (Michie Supp. 2000).
162 See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13B.030 (4) (Michie Supp. 2000).
163 See 40 Ky. ADMIN. REGs. 5:010 (2001).
I" See Levinson, supra note 3, at 260.
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B. Lay Representation
KBA Opinion U-27 (1980) reiterated the longstanding position of the
Court 65 and the Unauthorized Practice Committee that non-attorneys, and non-
attorney employees of corporations, cannot represent other persons, including
their own employer corporation, in administrative adjudication.' 6 Kentucky law
on this point is different from the law of some surrounding states. 67 I advised
the hearing officer trainees to keep this opinion in their "bench books."
C. Authorizing Practice and the Separation of Powers
In Kentucky, there have been a number of fights over the power of the
legislative and executive branches to "authorize" lay representation in
administrative adjudication. In every case, the Unauthorized Practice Committee
and the Supreme Court have stuck to their guns, opining that such efforts violate
the constitutional principle of separation of powers. 168 The most recent
pronouncement of the principle came in Turner v. Kentucky Bar Association,
69
in which the Court held that KRS 342.320(9),170 which authorized non-lawyers to
represent injured workers, employers, and insurance carriers in proceedings
before the Department of Worker's Claims, was unconstitutional.' 7
D. Foreign Lawyers and Local Counsel
KBA U-27 also addressed the issue of representation by lawyers who are
not admitted in Kentucky. 172 The Unauthorized Practice Committee opined that
165 See Ky. State Bar Ass'n v. Henry Vogt Machine Co., 416 S.W.2d 727 (Ky. 1967) (holding that a
director of personnel who appeared for his company at a hearing before the Unemployment
Insurance Commission was guilty of the unauthorized practice of law).
'6 See Ky. Bar Ass'n Unauthorized Practice Comm. Op. U-27 (1980).
167 See ABA/BNA LAW. MAN. PROF. CON. 21:8010 (1999) (citing an ABA 1999 Survey Of
Unauthorized Practice Of Law Committees, which reports that I 1 out of 34 states responding
reported that they allow nonlawyers to appear as representatives before state administrative
a~encies).
See, e.g., Ky. Bar Ass'n Unauthorized Practice Comm. Op. U-48 (1995) (dealing with the issue
of insurance adjusters attempting to handle cases for members of the public under the authority of
KRS 304.9-070 and KRS 304.9-430. The opinion states: "The legislature cannot authorize
conduct in violation of SCR 3.020. That is a matter for the Supreme Court."). Id., reprinted in
Richard Underwood, Advisory Ethics Opinions, 43, 47 Ky. BENCH & BAR (Fall 1995).
'69 980 S.W.2d 560 (Ky. 1998). The opinion was rendered on review of an unauthorized practice
opinion, Ky. Bar Ass'n Unauthorized Practice Comm. Op. U-52 (1997), reprinted in Marcus Carey,
Unauthorized Practice Opinions, 54, 55 Ky. BENCH & BAR (Summer 1997). The opinion in Turner
made a big point of saying that "as the Supreme Court has no regulatory control over non-attorneys,
[the lay worker's compensation specialists would [have] provide[d] legal representation without
being subject to the professional standards applied to lawyers." Id. at 562. However, the Court then
said it would allow such specialists to work, in essence, as "paralegals" under the direct supervision
of licensed counsel. See id.
170 See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 342.320 (9) (Michie 1997).
"' See Turner v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 980 S.W.2d 560, 563 (Ky. 1998).
172 See Ky. Bar Ass'n Unauthorized Practice Comm. Op. U-27 (1980). See also text accompanying
note 164.
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in Kentucky administrative proceedings, non-admitted lawyers must comply with
SCR 3.030(2) which provides:
A person admitted to practice in another state, but not in this
state, shall be permitted to practice a case in this state only if he
subjects himself to the jurisdiction and Rules of the Court
covering professional conduct and engages a member of the
association as co-counsel, whose presence shall be necessary at
all trials and at other times when required by the court.
173
Does that mean that local counsel must be present during the hearing,
performing a sort of "sergeant-at-arms" role? Presumably local counsel has some
responsibility for the conduct of his non-admitted co-counsel.' 74 Indeed the
justifications for requiring local counsel are supposedly to insure that a lawyer
familiar with the nuances of Kentucky procedure, and a lawyer fully subject to
bar discipline, will be present or available.175 This would call for the presence of
local counsel. On the other hand, some hearing officers may share my view that
the presence of local counsel throughout the proceedings may not be necessary,
and may impose unnecessary expense on a party. I am inclined to think that most
foreign counsel will do a competent job, and that most of them won't run amok.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the language of SCR 3.030(2), which
refers to "all trials," might not include "hearings." These are arguments in
support of giving the hearing officer some discretion in the matter.
E. Discipline of Laymen and Foreign Lawyers
Parties and persons appearing pro se may be controlled by default orders
and the like. 176 In states where agencies are permitted to authorize the practice by
non-lawyers (again, Kentucky is not such a state) the agencies have the power to
establish and enforce standards of conduct for non-lawyers. 177 These standards
7 SUP. CT. R. 3.030 (2), KY. RULES ANN. Vol. 2 (Michie 2001).
'74 See, e.g., Ky. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 11, Ky. RULES ANN. Vol. 1 (Michie 2001). See
also KY. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.1 (b), (c), Sup. CT. R. 3.130, Ky. RULES ANN.
Vol. 2 (Michie 2001) (stating: (b) "A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another
lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Rules of
Professional Conduct. (c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Rules
of Professional Conduct only if .... ). See also KY. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.2
(a), (b), Sup. CT. R. 3.130, KY. RULES ANN. Vol. 2 (Michie 2001):
(a) A lawyer is bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct notwithstanding that the
lawyer acted at the direction of another person. (b) A subordinate lawyer does not violate
the Rules of Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory
lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.
Id.
"' Some say that the real purpose is Kentucky lawyer full employment. People can be so cynical.
116 See supra text accompanying note 146.
'7 See KOCH, supra note 42, § 6.24 (3).
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should be the same as the standards for lawyers, at least insofar as the rules relate
to the fair, conduct of the proceeding.1
78
Foreign lawyers admitted pro hoc vice can be controlled by default
orders and exclusion. Their misconduct can also be referred to their own bar
associations. 79 By appearing before a Kentucky agency, with the assistance of
local counsel, a foreign lawyer agrees to abide by the Kentucky Rules of
Professional Conduct, and any disciplinary tribunal to which the matter is
referred should apply the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct to the lawyer's
conduct.8 While it is true that the Kentucky Bar Association has no ability to
discipline a layman or a foreign lawyer directly, the power to exclude the
representative, punish the representative's client through default orders, or refer
the matter to an appropriate disciplinary authority are sufficient to curb unethical
conduct.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this brief survey I have summarized the Kentucky law relating to bias
and disqualification of administrative adjudicators, and the prohibition of ex
parte communications. I have also reviewed the ethical rules relating to the
conduct of representatives appearing before administrative adjudicators, and the
rules relating to admission and unauthorized practice.
Kentucky took a big step forward when it adopted a uniform
administrative hearing act' 8' and created what amounts to a small central panel of
full-time hearing officers. Although many agencies are exempted from the act,
the statute does provide a model, and the case law that develops around this
model will provide much needed guidance. It is also possible that individual
agencies and the Chief Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative
Hearings will adopt a version of the Code of Judicial Conduct to supplement the
statutory rules relating to disqualification of, and ethical conduct of, hearing
officers.
Given the vigor with which Kentucky's unauthorized practice rule is
enforced and the inability of Kentucky agencies to authorize lay practice, the
statutory preference for lawyer-hearing officers, and the mandatory training
178 See Levinson, supra note 3, at 264.
179 See KY. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 8.4 cmt. 1, Sup. CT. R. 3.130, Ky. RULES ANN.
Vol. 2 (Michie 2001) ("In modem practice lawyers frequently act outside the territorial limit of the
jurisdiction in which they are licensed to practice . . . . In doing so, they remain subject to
goveming authority of the jurisdiction in which they are licensed to practice.").
o See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 8.5 (b) (1) (2000):
In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the rules of professional
conduct to be applied shall be as follows: (1) for conduct in connection with a proceeding
in a court before which the lawyer has been admitted to practice (either generally or for
purposes of that proceeding), the rules to be applied shall be the rules of the jurisdiction
in which the court sits, unless the rules of the court provide otherwise ....
Id.
'81 See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13B.005-13B.170 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2000).
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APPENDIX
PROPOSED CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR HEARING OFFICERS
KENTUCKY ASSOCIATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATORS
The Ethics Canon Committee
Canon 1: A hearing officer shall uphold the integrity and independence of the
administrative judiciary.
Canon 2: A hearing officer shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of the hearing officer's activities.
Canon 3: A hearing officer shall perform the duties of office impartially and
diligently.
Canon 4: A hearing officer shall so conduct the hearing officer's extra-judicial
activities as to minimize the risk of conflict with judicial obligations.
Canon 5: A hearing officer shall refrain from inappropriate political activity.
PREAMBLE
Our legal system is based on the principle that an independent, fair, and
competent administrative judiciary will interpret and apply the laws that govern
us. The role of the administrative judiciary is central to American and Kentucky
concepts of justice and the rule of law. Intrinsic to all sections of this Code are
the precepts that hearing officers, individually and collectively, must respect and
honor their office as a public trust and strive to enhance and maintain confidence
in our legal system. The hearing officer is an arbiter of facts and law for the
resolution of disputes and a highly visible symbol of government under the rule
of law.
The Code of Judicial Conduct for Hearing Officers is intended to
establish standards for ethical conduct of hearing officers. The Canons and
Sections are rules of reason. They should be applied consistent with
constitutional requirements, statutes, administrative rules, and decisional law, and
in the context of all relevant circumstances, including the varying degrees of
responsibility and administrative functions of different hearing officers. The
Code is to be construed so as not to impinge on the essential discretion of hearing
officers in making judicial decisions.
The Code of Judicial Conduct for Hearing Officers is not intended as an
exhaustive guide for the conduct of hearing officers. Hearing officers should also
be governed in their judicial and personal conduct by general ethical standards.
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The Code is intended, however, to state basic standards which should govern the
conduct of all hearing officers and to provide guidance to assist hearing officers
in establishing and maintaining high standards of judicial and personal conduct.
The Code of Judicial Conduct for Hearing Officers is based on the
Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct and should be interpreted when appropriate
in accordance with the opinions and commentary for the Kentucky Code of
Judicial Conduct.
TERMINOLOGY
"De minimis" denotes an insignificant interest that could not raise reasonable
question as to a hearing officer's impartiality.
"Economic interest" denotes ownership of a more than de minimis legal or
equitable interest, or a relationship as officer, director, advisor, or other active
participant in the affairs of a party, except that:
(i) ownership of an interest in a mutual or common investment fund
that hold securities is not an economic interest in such securities
unless the hearing officer participates in the management of the
fund or a proceeding pending or impending before the hearing
officer could substantially affect the value of the interest;
(ii) service by a hearing officer as an officer, director, advisor, or
other active participant in an educational, religious, charitable,
fraternal, or civic organization, or service by a hearing officer's
spouse, parent, or child as an officer, director, advisor, or other
active participant in any organization does not create an
economic interest in securities held by that organization;
(iii) a deposit in a financial institution, the proprietary interest of a
policy holder in a mutual insurance company, of a depositor in a
mutual savings association or of a member in a credit union, or a
similar proprietary interest, is not an economic interest in the
organization unless a proceeding pending or impending before
the hearing officer could substantially affect the value of the
interest;
(iv) ownership of government securities is not an economic interest
in the issuer unless a proceeding pending or impending before
the hearing officer could substantially affect the value of the
securities.
"Ex parte communication" means the hearing officer's. communication off the
record with any party to the administrative proceeding, or with any other person
who has a direct or indirect interest in the outcome of the administrative
proceeding, concerning any substantive issue, while the proceeding is pending.
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"Fiduciary" includes such relationships as executor, administrator, trustee, and
guardian.
"Invidious discrimination" includes any action by an organization that appears to
regard some immutable individual trait, such as a person's race, gender, religion,
or national origin, as odious or inferior, which is used to justify arbitrary
exclusion of persons possessing those traits from membership or participation in
the organization. On the other hand, organization dedicated to the preservation of
,religions, fraternal sororal, spiritual, charitable, civic, or cultural values, which do
not stigmatize any excluded persons as inferior and therefore unworthy of
membership, are not considered to discriminate invidiously.
"Judicial duties" include all the duties of the hearing officer's office prescribed
by law.
"Hearing officer" includes any person to whom the authority to conduct an
administrative adjudication has been delegated by the administrative agency or
by statute.
"Knowingly," "knowledge," "known," or "knows" denotes actual knowledge of
the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.
"Law" denotes statutes, administrative rules, constitutional provisions, and
decisional law.
"Member of the hearing officer's family" denotes a spouse, child, grandchild,
parent, grandparent, or other relative or person with whom the hearing officer
maintains a close familial relationship.
"Member of the hearing officer's family residing in the hearing officer's
household" denotes any relative of a hearing officer by blood or marriage, or a
person treated by a hearing officer as a member of the hearing officer's family,
who resides in the hearing officer's household.
"Political organization" denotes a political party or other group, the principal
purpose of which is to further the election or appointment of candidates to
political office.
"Require." The rules prescribing that a hearing officer "require" certain conduct
of others are, like all of the rules in this Code, rules of reason. The use of the
term "require" in that context means a hearing officer is to exercise reasonable
direction and control over the conduct of those persons subject to the hearing
officer's direction and control.
"Third degree of relationship." The following persons are relatives within the
third degree of relationship: great-grandparent, grandparent, parent, uncle, aunt,
brother, sister, child, grandchild, great-grandchild, nephew, or niece.
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CANON 1
CANON 1: A hearing officer shall uphold the integrity and independence of the
administrative judiciary.
An independent and honorable administrative judiciary is indispensable to justice
in our society. A hearing officer should actively participate in establishing,
maintaining, and enforcing high standards of conduct, and shall personally
observe those standards so that the integrity and independence of the
administrative judiciary will be preserved. The provisions of this Code are to be
construed and applied to further that objective.
CANON 2
CANON 2: A hearing officer shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of the hearing officer's activities.
1. A hearing officer shall respect and comply with the law and shall act
at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the administrative judiciary.
2. A hearing officer may properly lend the prestige of the hearing
officer's office to advance the public interest in the administration of
justice.
3. A hearing officer may actively support public agencies or interests or
testify voluntarily on public matters concerning the law, the legal
system, the provision of legal services, and the administration of
justice.
4. A hearing officer shall not lend the prestige of judicial office to
advance the private interest of the hearing officer or others; nor shall
a hearing officer convey or permit others to convey the impression
that others are in a special position to influence the hearing officer.
(i) A hearing officer shall not allow family, social, political, or other
relationships to impair the hearing officer's objectivity.
(ii) A hearing officer shall not testify voluntarily as a character
witness.
5. A hearing officer shall not hold membership in any organization that
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CANON 3: A hearing officer shall perform the duties of office impartially and
diligently.
6. Judicial Duties in General. The judicial duties of a hearing officer
take precedence over all the hearing officer's other activities. In the
performance of these duties, the following standards apply.
7. Adjudicative Responsibilities
(1) A hearing officer shall hear and decide matters assigned to the
hearing officer, except those matters in which disqualification is
required.
(2) A hearing officer shall be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence in it. A hearing officer shall not be
swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism.
(3) A hearing officer shall require order and decorum in proceedings
before the hearing officer.
(4) A hearing officer shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to
litigants, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom the hearing
officer deals in an official capacity, and shall require similar
conduct of participants in proceedings before the hearing officer,
and of staff members and others subject to the hearing officer's
direction and control.
(5) A hearing officer shall perform judicial duties without bias or
prejudice. A hearing officer shall not, in the performance of
judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice,
including but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon race,
sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation,
or socioeconomic status, and shall not, in proceedings before the
hearing officer, permit staff members and others subject to the
hearing officer's direction and control to do so.
(6) A hearing officer shall require the participants in proceedings
before the hearing officer to refrain from manifesting by words
or conduct bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion,
national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or
socioeconomic status, against parties, witnesses, counsel, or
others. This Section does not preclude legitimate advocacy when
race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual
orientation, or socioeconomic status, or other similar factors, are
issues in the proceeding.
(7) A hearing officer shall accord to every person who has a legal
interest in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer or
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representative, the right to be heard according to law. With
regard to a pending or impending proceeding, a hearing officer
shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications.
(a) If an ex parte communication occurs, the hearing officer
shall note the occurrence for the record, and the hearing
officer shall place in the record a copy of the
communication, if it was written, or a memorandum of the
substance of the communication, if it was oral.
(b) As a part of legal research, a hearing officer may obtain the
advice of a disinterested expert on the law applicable to a
pIroceeding before the hearing officer.
(c) A hearing officer may consult with support personnel whose
function is to aid the hearing officer in carrying out the
hearing officer's adjudicative responsibilities or with other
hearing officers.
(d) A hearing officer may, with the consent of the parties, confer
separately with the parties and their lawyers or
representatives in an effort to mediate or settle matters
pending before the hearing officer.
(e) A hearing officer may initiate or consider any ex parte
communications when expressly authorized by law to do so.
(8) A hearing officer shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly,
efficiently, and fairly.
(9) A hearing officer shall not, while a proceeding is pending or
impending in any administrative fourum or court, make any public
comment that might reasonably be expected to affect its outcome
or impair its fairness or make any non-public comment that
might substantially interfere with a fair hearing. The hearing
officer shall require similar abstention on the part of staff
members subject to the hearing officer's direction and control.
This Section does not prohibit hearing officers from making
public statements in the course of their official duties or from
explaining for public information the procedures of the
administrative body. This Section does not apply to proceedings
in which the hearing officer is a litigant in a personal capacity.-
(10) A hearing officer shall not commend or criticize an agency head
for its decision other than in an opinion in a proceeding.
(11) A hearing officer shall not disclose or use, for any purpose
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unrelated to judicial duties, information acquired in a judicial
capacity that by law is not available to the general public.
(12) A hearing officer should not be subject to the authority,
direction, or discretion of a person who has served as an
investigator, prosecutor, or advocate in a proceeding before the
hearing officer, or in any pre-adjudicative stage of the
proceeding
8. Administrative Responsibilities
(1) A hearing officer shall diligently discharge the hearing officer's
administrative responsibilities without' bias or prejudice and
maintain professional competence in judicial administration, and
should cooperate with other hearing officers and staff members
in the administration ofthe hearing officer's duties.
(2) A hearing officer shall require staff members and those subject
to the hearing officer's direction and control, and should
encourage other administrative officials, to observe the standardsof fidelity and diligence that apply to the hearing officer and to
refrain from manifesting bias or prejudice in the performance of
their official duties.
(3) A hearing officer with supervisory authority for the performance
of other hearing officers shall take reasonable measures to assure
the prompt disposition of matters before them and the proper
performance of their other judicial responsibilities.
9. Disciplinary Responsibilities
(1) A hearing officer who receives information indicating a
substantial likelihood that another hearing officer has committed
a violation of this Code should take appropriate action. A
hearing officer having knowledge that another hearing officer
has committed a violation of this Code that raises a substantial
question as to the other hearing officer's fitness for office should
inform the appropriate authority.
(2) A hearing officer who receives information indicating a
substantial likelihood that a lawyer has committed a violation of
the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct should take
appropriate action. A hearing officer having knowledge that a
lawyer has committed a violation of the Kentucky Rules of
Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to the
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects should inform the appropriate authority.
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10. Disqualification
(1) A hearing officer shall disqualify himself or herself in a
proceeding in which the hearing officer's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances
where:
(a) the hearing officer has a personal bias or prejudice
concerning a party or a party's lawyer or representative, or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning
the proceeding;
(b) the hearing officer served as a lawyer or representative in the
matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom the hearing
officer previously practiced law served during such
association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the hearing
officer has been a material witness concerning it;
(c) the hearing officer knows that he or she, individually or as a
fiduciary, or the hearing officer's spouse, parent, or minor
child residing in the hearing officer's household, has any
interest, more than a de minimis interest, in the subject
matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding that
could be substantially affected by the proceeding;
(d) the hearing officer or the hearing officer's spouse, or a
person within the third degree of relationship to either of
them or the spouse of such a person:
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or
trustee of a party;
(ii) is acting as a lawyer or representative in the
proceeding;
(ii) is known by the hearing officer to have a more than
de minimis interest that could be substantially
affected by the proceedings;
(iii) is to the hearing officer's knowledge likely to be a
material witness to the proceeding.
(2) A hearing officer shall keep informed about the hearing officer's
personal and fiduciary economic interest, and make a reasonable
effort to keep informed about the personal economic interests of
the hearing officer's spouse and minor children residing in the
hearing officer's household.
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11. Remittal of Disqualification. A hearing officer disqualified by the
terms of Canon 3E may disclose on the record the basis of the
hearing officer's disqualification and may ask the parties and their
lawyers or representatives to consider, out of the presence of the
hearing officer, whether to waive disqualification. If following
disclosure of any basis for disqualification, other than personal bias
or prejudice concerning a party, the parties and lawyers or
representative, without participation by the hearing officer, all agree
that the hearing officer should not be disqualified, and the hearing
officer is then willing to participate, the hearing officer may
participate in the proceeding. The agreement, signed by all parties
and lawyers or representatives, shall be incorporated in the record of
the proceeding.
CANON 4
CANON 4: A hearing officer shall so conduct the hearing officer's extra-judicial
activities as to minimize the risk of conflict with judicial obligations.
12. Extra-Judicial Activities in General. A hearing officer shall conduct
all of the hearing officer's extra-judicial activities so that they do not:
(1) cast reasonable doubt on the hearing officer's capacity to act
impartially as a hearing officer;
(2) demean the judicial office; or
(3) interfere with the performance ofjudicial duties.
13. Avocational Activities. A hearing officer may speak, write, lecture,
teach, and participate in other extra-judicial activities concerning the
law, the legal system, the administration of justice, and non-legal
subjects, subject to the requirements of this Code.
14. Governmental, Civic, and Charitable Activities.
(1) A hearing officer may appear at a hearing before an executive or
legislative body or official and may otherwise consult with an
executive or legislative body or official, under the following
circumstances:
(a) if the appearance or consultation is not otherwise prohibited
by law or by any other provision of this Code;
(b) if the appearance or consultation casts no doubt on the
hearing officer's capacity to decide impartially any issue that
may come before the hearing officer; and
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(c) if the appearance or consultation includes no matter that is
likely to come before the administrative agency for which
the hearing officer serves as hearing officer.
(2) A hearing officer shall not accept appointment to a governmental
committee or commission or other governmental position that is
concerned with issues of fact or policy on matters that will come
before the hearing officer or that will come before the
administrative body for which the hearing officer serves as
hearing officer. A hearing officer may accept appointment to a
governmental committee or commission where an appointment
of a hearing officer to the governmental committee is authorized
or required by law or where the governmental committee or
commission involves the improvement of the law, the legal
system, or the administration of justice. A hearing officer may
represent a country, state, or locality on ceremonial occasions or
in connection with historical, educational, or cultural activities.
(3) A hearing officer may serve as an officer, director, trustee, or
non-legal advisor of an organization or governmental agency
devoted to the improvement of the law, the legal system, or the
administration of justice, or of an educational, religious,
charitable, fraternal, or civic organization not conducted for
profit, subject to the following limitations and the other
requirements of this Code.
(a) A hearing officer shall not serve as an officer, director,
trustee, or non-legal advisor if it is likely that the
organization:
(i) will be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily
come before the hearing officer or the administrative
body for which the hearing officer serves as hearing
officer; or
(ii) by reason of its purpose, will have a substantial
interest in other proceedings in the administrative
body for which the hearing officer serves as hearing
officer.
(b) A hearing officer as an officer, director, trustee, or non-legal
advisor, or as a member or otherwise:
(i) may assist such an organization in planning fund
raising and may participate in the management and
investment of the organization's funds, but shall not
personally participate in the solicitation of funds or
other fund-raising activities;
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(ii) may make recommendations to public and private
fund granting organizations on projects and
programs concerning the law, the legal system, or
the administration of justice;
(iii) shall not personally participate in membership
solicitation if the solicitation might reasonably be
perceived as coercive or, except as permitted in
Canon 4C(3)(b)(i), if the membership solicitation is
essentially a fund raising mechanism;
(iv) shall not use or permit the use of the prestige of
judicial office for fund raising or membership
solicitation.
15. Financial Activities
(1) A hearing officer shall not engage in financial and business
dealings that:
(a) may reasonably be perceived to exploit'the hearing officer's
position, or
(b) involve the hearing officer in frequent transactions or
continuing business relationships with those lawyers or other
persons likely to come before the administrative body for
which the hearing officer serves as hearing officer.
(2) A hearing officer may, subject to the requirements of this Code,
hold and manage investments of the hearing officer and
members of the hearing officer's family, including real estate,
and engage in other remunerative activity.
(3) A hearing officer may serve as an officer, director, manager,
general partner, advisor, or employee of any business entity
subject to the following limitations and the other requirements of
this Code:
(a) A hearing officer shall not be involved in any business
entity:
(i) held in disrepute in the community; or
(ii) likely to be engaged in proceedings that would
ordinarily come before the hearing officer or the
administrative body for which the hearing officer
services as hearing officer.
Vol. 29:2
REINSTATEMENT TO LEGAL PRACTICE IN KENTUCKY
(b) A hearing officer involved with any business entity may
assist such a business entity in planning fund raising and
may participate in the management and investment of the
entity's funds, but shall not personally participate in the
solicitation of funds, the raising of capital, or the selling of
stock in such a manner as to use or permit the use of the
prestige of judicial office for promotion of the business
entity.
(4) A hearing officer shall manage the hearing officer's investment
and other financial interests to minimize the number of cases in
which the hearing officer is disqualified. As soon as the hearing
officer can do so without serious financial detriment, the hearing
officer shall divest himself or herself of investments and other
financial interests that might require frequent disqualification.
(5) A hearing officer shall not accept, and shall urge members of the
hearing officer's family residing in the hearing officer's
household not to accept, a gift, bequest, favor, or loan from
anyone except for:
(a) a gift incident to a public testimonial, books, tapes, and other
resource materials supplied by publishers on a
complimentary basis for official use, or an invitation to the
hearing officer and the hearing officer's spouse or guest to
attend a bar related function or an activity devoted to the
improvement of the law, the legal system, or the
administration of justice;
(b) a gift, award, or benefit incident to the business, profession,
or other separate activity of a spouse or other family member
of a hearing officer residing in the hearing officer's
household, including gifts, awards, and benefits for the use
of both the spouse or other family member and the hearing
officer (as spouse or family member), provided the gift,
award, or benefit could not reasonably be perceived as
intended to influence the hearing officer in the performance
ofjudicial duties;
(c) ordinary social hospitality or customary expressions of
sympathy;
(d) a gift from a relative or friend, for a special occasion, such as
a wedding, anniversary, or birthday, if the gift is fairly
commensurate with the occasion and the relationship;
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(e) a gift, bequest, favor, or loan from a relative or close
personal friend whose appearance or interest in a case would
in any event require disqualification under Canon 3E;
(f) a loan from a lending institution in its regular course of
business on the same terms generally available to persons
who are not hearing officers;
(g) a scholarship or fellowship awarded on the same terms and
based on the same criteria applied to other applicants; or
(h) any other gift, bequest, favor, or loan, only if: the donor is
not party or other person who has come or is likely to come
or whose interests have come or are likely to come before
the hearing officer.
16. Fiduciary Activities
(1) A hearing officer may serve as executor, administrator, or other
personal representative, trustee, guardian, attorney in fact, or
other fiduciary, only if such service will not interfere with the
proper performance of the hearing officer's duties.
(2) The same restriction on financial activities that apply to a
hearing officer personally also apply to the hearing officer while
acting in a fiduciary capacity.
17. Service as Arbitrator or Mediator. A hearing officer may act as an
arbitrator or a mediator if such activity does not affect the
independent professional judgment of the hearing officer or the
conduct of the hearing officer's official duties. A hearing officer
shall not act as an arbitrator or a mediator in a matter over which the
hearing officer may later preside.
18. Practice of Law.
(1) A hearing officer may practice law if such activity would affect
neither the independent professional judgment of the hearing
officer nor the conduct of the hearing officer's official duties,
and if such activity would not violate any other provisions of this
Code.
(2) A hearing officer shall not accept the representation of a client
who is a litigant before the administrative body for which the
hearing officer serves as hearing officer or if there is a likelihood
that such person will appear before the hearing officer.
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(3) The hearing officer shall not practice law before the
administrative body for which the hearing officer serves as
hearing officer.
19. Compensation and Reimbursement. A hearing officer may receive
compensation and reimbursement of expenses for the extra-judicial
activities permitted by this Code, if the source of such payments does
not give the appearance of influencing the hearing officer's
performance of judicial duties or otherwise give the appearance of
impropriety.
(1) Compensation shall not exceed a reasonable amount nor shall it
exceed what a person who is not a hearing officer would receive
for the same activity.
(2) Expense reimbursement shall be limited to the actual cost of
travel, food, and lodging reasonably 'incurred by the hearing
officer and, where appropriate to the occasion, by the hearing
officer's spouse or guest. Any payment in excess of such an
amount is compensation.
I. Disclosure of a hearing officer's income, debts, investment, or other
-assets is required only to the extent provided in this Canon and in Canon
3E and F, or as otherwise required by law.
CANON 5
CANON 5: A hearing officer shall refrain from inappropriate political activity.
20. Political Conduct in General
(1) A hearing officer shall not:
(a) act as a leader or hold any office in a political organization;
(b) make speeches for or against a political organization or
candidate or publicly endorse or oppose a candidate for
public office;
(c) solicit funds for or pay an assessment to a political
organization or candidate.
(2) A hearing officer may engage in political activity on behalf of
measures to improve the law, the legal system, or the
administration of justice, as provided in Canon 2B and C.
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